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ATTORNEY±CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE 
KOVEL DOCTRINE: SHOULD WISCONSIN 
EXTEND THE PRIVILEGE TO 
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THIRD-PARTY 
CONSULTANTS?   
In today’s marketplace, the way that corporations conduct business is 
drastically changing, and lawyers are increasingly relying on third-party 
consultants, such as accountants or investment bankers, to facilitate them in 
providing accurate legal advice to corporate clients.  Despite this reliance, 
whether the attorney–client privilege protects the communications between an 
attorney and a third-party consultant is often questioned.  In United States v. 
Kovel, the Second Circuit found that the attorney–client privilege extended to 
communications between an attorney and a third-party consultant who acted 
as an interpreter.  However, both federal and state courts have since split over 
the proper scope of the Kovel doctrine.  In particular, courts have applied both 
a narrow and broad interpretation of the Kovel doctrine, rendering the 
application of the doctrine unpredictable.  
Wisconsin in particular has not yet addressed whether the attorney–client 
privilege should apply to third-party consultants, and if so, what the proper
scope of or limitations to the privilege should be.  Based upon an analysis of 
both federal and state courts’ application of the attorney–client privilege as 
well as Wisconsin’s own statutes and policies, this Comment recommends that 
Wisconsin follow other states and adopt the Kovel doctrine.  Rather than apply 
a broad application, Wisconsin should adopt a narrow, but lenient, approach 
to the Kovel doctrine.  Specifically, Wisconsin courts should analyze (1) 
whether there is sufficient evidence, other than the substance of the 
communications, to determine that the consultant was hired for the facilitation 
of legal advice and (2) whether the third-party consultant acts as a translator 
of client only information. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The way that corporations conduct their businesses and manage the global 
marketplace is drastically changing.1  Due to the complexity and legal demands 
of the marketplace, organizations are increasingly downsizing, restructuring, 
and relying more on third-party consultants to competitively perform in the 
marketplace.2  Rather than have an employee perform a service, corporations 
utilize third-party consultants who function as independent contractors to 
perform the once traditional employee services.3
1. See generally Robert Eli Rosen, “We’re All Consultants Now”: How Change in Client 
Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal Services, 44 
ARIZ. L. REV. 637 (2002) (arguing that changes in businesses have affected how legal services are 
rendered to corporations).   
2. Id. at 641±50. 
3. Edward J. Imwinkelried & Andrew Amoroso, The Application of the Attorney–Client 
Privilege to Interactions Among Clients, Attorneys, and Experts in the Age of Consultants: The Need 
for A More Precise, Fundamental Analysis, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 265, 272 (2011) [hereinafter 
Imwinkelried]; Rosen, supra QRWH  DW  ³Having downsized, outsourcing recommends that 
companies use non-employee workers on a project basis.  Today, µPDQ\EDVLF organizational functions 
DUHHLWKHURXWVRXUFHGRUGRQHFROODERUDWLYHO\ZLWKRXWVLGHUV¶´(footnote omitted) (quoting Walter W. 
Powell, The Capitalist Firm in the Twenty-First Century: Emerging Patterns in Western Enterprise, in
THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 33, 64 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001)); see also Denise Horan, Why Use a Consultant for 
Your Business?, DENISE HORAN: SALE AND MGMT. STRATEGY, CONSULTING, & TRAINING (Mar. 12, 
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)XUWKHUPRUH LQ WRGD\¶V ZRUOG legal risks are rarely isolated matters.  
Instead, these legal risks affect other corporate or business decisions.4  Because 
of the effect that OHJDOGHFLVLRQVFDQKDYHRQDFRUSRUDWLRQ¶VDFWLRQVEXVLQHVVHV
have utilized a variety of consultants from a range of fields to help them make 
informed business decisions.5  For example, attorneys have utilized the 
expertise and knowledge of third-party accountants,6 public relation 
consultants,7 investment bankers,8 and actuarial consultants9 to provide legal 
advice.  These professional consultants often possess information and expertise 
that is necessary for lawyers to accurately give legal advice to clients regarding 
the consequences or risks of a business decision.10
However, when attorneys consult with third-party consultants, there is often 
a question as to whether the communications are protected by the attorney±
client privilege.  Traditionally, the attorney±client privilege protected 
communications between an attorney and client that were made in confidence 
for the purpose of seeking legal advice.11  In Upjohn Co. v. United States,12 the 
Supreme Court held that the attorney±client privilege applied to corporations 
and delineated that the purpose of the attorney±client privilege is to provide 
³IXOO DQG IUDQN FRPPXQLFDWLRQ>V@´ EHWZHHQ WKH FOLHQW DQG WKH DWWRUQH\13
Because the business landscape is changing with the increasing use of third-
party consultants, understanding when, if at all, attorney±client privilege 
2018), http://www.denisehoran.com/news-articles/Why-Use-a-Consultant-for-Your-Business--74-
news.htm [https://perma.cc/LB62-9596]. 
4. Rosen, supra note 1, at 659 (³Legal risks not only must be assessed, but also processed because 
legal risks often are not detached risks.´
5. Michele DeStefano Beardslee, The Corporate Attorney–Client Privilege: Third-Rate Doctrine 
for Third-Party Consultants, 62 SMU L. REV. 727, 736 (2009) (³*LYHQ WRGD\¶V KLJKO\ UHJXODWHG
litigious, publicized, and complex marketplace, corporations often rely on consultants from various 
disciplines to help make business and legal decisions.´
6. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 919 (2d Cir. 1961).  
7. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 322, 324 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
8. See United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 138 (2d Cir. 1999).  
9. See Cottillion v. United Ref. Co., 279 F.R.D. 290, 299 (W.D. Pa. 2011).  
10. See Beardslee, supra note 5, at 737±39 (explaining how an interview Beardslee conducted 
with a general counsel revealed the extent that attorneys may need the advice and expertise of PR 
consultants to provide efficient legal advice). 
11. See, e.g., )HUNRY1DW¶O$VV¶QIRU6WRFN&DU$XWR5DFing, 218 F.R.D. 125, 133 (E.D. Tex. 
2003). 
12. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).  
13. Id. at 389±95.  
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DWWDFKHVWR³IXOODQGIUDQN´FRPPXQLFDWLRQVLVYLWDOIRUERWKFRUSRUDWLRQVDQG
attorneys alike.   
In the landmark case, United States v. Kovel,14 the Second Circuit applied 
the attorney±client privilege to communications between an attorney and 
accountant where the accountant assisted the attorney in understanding the 
FOLHQW¶VILQDQFLDOLQIRUPDWLRQIRUWKHIDFLOLWDWLRQRIOHJDODGYLFH15  However, 
since Kovel was decided, courts have split regarding the proper scope of the 
Kovel doctrine.16  Some federal courts have narrowed Kovel¶VKROGLQJOLPLWLQJ
the application of the attorney±client privilege when applied to third-party 
consultants.17  A few other courts have applied the Kovel doctrine broadly.18
While the Kovel doctrine has been applied in multiple federal circuits,  there is 
no singular consensus on the proper scope of or limitations to the privilege, 
rendering the application of the doctrine unpredictable.19
Furthermore, state courts have also adopted the Kovel doctrine and have 
applied it in their jurisdictions.20  Similar to the federal courts, these states have 
yet to adopt a uniform consensus as to how broadly or narrowly the Kovel
doctrine should be applied. 21  While many states have adopted or considered 
the Kovel doctrine, Wisconsin has yet to confront a case involving the doctrine.  
$OWKRXJK:LVFRQVLQ¶VDWWRUQH\±client privilege is contained in a statute rather 
than the common law, the codified attorney±client privilege evidentiary rule 
does not explicitly address whether communications between attorneys and 
third-party consultants are covered by the privilege.22  This Comment will 
examine whether Wisconsin should adopt the Kovel doctrine as defined by 
other courts, and if so, whether the scope of the privilege should be limiting or 
broad. 2YHUDOO EDVHG RQ:LVFRQVLQ¶V FDVH ODZDQGSROLFLHV XQGHUO\LQJ WKH
attorney±client privilege, this Comment recommends that Wisconsin follow 
other states and adopt the Kovel doctrine.  Rather than apply a broad application 
of the test, Wisconsin should adopt a narrow, but lenient, approach to the Kovel
14. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).  
15. Id. at 920±23.  
16. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 284 (³If an attorney±client±expert interaction does not fall 
within the parameters of the [Kovel doctrine], the courts split badly over the question of whether the 
legal privilege should apply to the communications involved in the interactions.´
17. Kim J. Gruetzmacher, Privileged Communications with Accountants: The Demise of United 
States v. Kovel, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 977   ³Over the past four decades, courts have 
repeatedly narrowed the holding in Kovel´see also infra Section III.B and accompanying notes. 
18. See infra Section III.C and accompanying notes.  
19. See infra Sections III.B, III.C and accompanying notes. 
20. See infra Section IV.A and accompanying notes.  
21. See infra Section IV.A and accompanying notes.  
22. See WIS. STAT. § 905.01 (2015±2016).  
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doctrine: one that is not so broad that the privilege applies to every situation but 
neither too narrow that the privilege is severely limited and inapplicable.  This 
LVLQNHHSLQJERWKZLWKRWKHUFRXUWV¶FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHGRFWULQHDQGDOVRZLWK
WKH:LVFRQVLQFRXUWV¶RZQWUHDWPHQWRIDWWRUQH\±client privilege doctrine.   
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of the attorney±client 
privilege, when the privilege is applicable, and the policy considerations 
underlying the privilege.  Part III analyzes the Kovel doctrine and examines the 
federal court cases that have followed Kovel.  This section highlights how some 
federal courts have narrowed Kovel¶VKROGLQJZKLOHDIHZRWKHUIHGHUDOFRXUWV
have been less rigid with the doctrine.  Part IV explores how states have 
interpreted the Kovel GRFWULQHDQGH[DPLQHV:LVFRQVLQ¶VRZQDSSURDFKWRWKH
attorney±client privilege before recommending that Wisconsin adopt a 
moderate but narrow approach to the Kovel doctrine.   
II. BACKGROUND ON ATTORNEY±CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
A. History of Attorney–Client Privilege  
The attorney±client privilege is ³the oldest of the privileges for confidential 
communications´23 and can be traced back to the 1600s during the Reign of 
Queen Elizabeth I.24  During the Elizabethan era, the holder of the privilege was 
WKHDWWRUQH\DFWLQJDVDJHQWOHPDQUDWKHUWKDQWKHFOLHQWDVLVWKHFDVHLQWRGD\¶V
understanding.25  During this time, the purpose of the privilege was to prevent 
an attorney from testifying against his client, an act that would be dishonorable 
23. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 542 (John T. 
McNaughton ed., 1961); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989). 
24. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2290, at 542; Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 267.  However, 
some commentators have also traced the origins of the attorney±client privilege to Roman law rather 
than during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I. See Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential 
Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487 (1928).  Under this theory, the 
attorney±FOLHQW SULYLOHJH RULJLQDWHG IURP WKH 5RPDQ FRQFHSW RI OR\DOW\ UDWKHU WKDQ D JHQWOHPDQ¶V
honor. Id. DW$FFRUGLQJWR0D[5DGLQ³>L@WZDVRQHRIWKHFRPPRQSODFHVRIWKH5RPDQODZWKDW
a servant²who was . . . a slave²PLJKWQRWJLYH WHVWLPRQ\DJDLQVWKLVPDVWHU´ LQSDUWEHFDXVH WKH
slave was an essential part of the family. Id. at 487±88.  This was bDVHGRQD³PXWXDOILGHOLW\´DQG
loyalty. Id. $OWKRXJKDQDWWRUQH\ZDVQRWDVODYHGXULQJWKLVWLPHDQDWWRUQH\ZRXOGEHDQ³KRQRUHG
DQGLQIOXHQWLDOVHUYDQW´ZKR³PXVWNHHSKLVPDVWHU¶VVHFUHWV´Id. at 487.  
25. See John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney–Client 
Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 445 (1982); WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2290, at 545. 
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610 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:605 
to a gentleman.26  Under this philosophy, a true gentleman would never disclose 
KLVFOLHQW¶VVHFUHWV.27
However, near the end of the eighteenth century, courts no longer used the 
attorney±client privilege,28 and it was not until the early nineteenth century that 
the privilege reemerged under a new policy theory.29  Rather than protect a 
JHQWOHPDQ¶VKRQRU RUSUHYHQW WKHGLYXOJHPHQWRI D FOLHQW¶V VHFUHWV WKHQHZ
theory underlying the adoption of the attorney±client privilege was based on 
utilitarian principles.30  In particular, in the American jurisprudence, attorney±
client privilege was based on the proposition that but for the protection of a 
FOLHQW¶VFRQILGHQWLDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQVFOLHQWVZRXOGEHOHVVZLOOLQJWRGLVFORVH
necessary information, irrevocably harming the facilitation of legal advice.31
5HPRYLQJDFOLHQW¶VIHDUVWKDWDQDWWRUQH\ZLOOUHSHDWFRQfidential information 
is vital to the attorney±client relationship and enables the attorney to give 
competent legal advice.32  Today, Federal Rules of Evidence 501 codifies the 
attorney±client privilege.33  It states that a claim of privilege is governed by the 
³FRPPRQODZ²as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and 
H[SHULHQFH´34
26. Ann M. Murphy, Spin Control and the High-Profile Client²Should the Attorney–Client 
Privilege Extend to Communications with Public Relations Consultants?, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 545, 
549±50 (2005); Emily Jones, Keeping Client Confidences: Attorney–Client Privilege and Work 
Product Doctrine in Light of United States v. Adlman, 18 PACE L. REV. 419, 421±22 (1998).  
27. Murphy, supra note 26, at 550.  
28. See Sexton, supra note 25, at 446 ³By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, however, 
the doctrine fell out of favor and was rejected as antithetical to the judicial search for truth.´
WIGMORE, supra QRWHDW³7KDWGRFWULQHKRZHYHUILQDOO\ORVWJURXQGDQGE\WKHODVW
quarter of the 1700s . . . ZDVHQWLUHO\UHSXGLDWHG´
29. Sexton, supra note 25, at 446; WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2290, at 543±44. 
30. WIGMORE, supra note 23, §§ 2290±91, at 541±54; see also Elizabeth G. 
Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney–Client Privilege, 69 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. DUJXLQJWKDW³[m]ost purpose myths supporting the attorney±
client privilege today are utilitarian ones.  In other words, rather than claiming that the privilege is 
intrinsically good, these myths claim that the privilege furtheUVVRPHRWKHUVRFLDOSROLF\´
31. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 267.  But see Sexton, supra note 25, at 464 (³[S]everal 
commentators have argued that because of the exigencies of the regulatory state and because of their 
general business needs, corporations would communicate with attorneys even if the privilege were not 
available.´ Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 363±66 (1989) 
DUJXLQJWKDW³LWLVSUREOHPDWLc to assume that clients would avoid lawyers to any significant degree 
PHUHO\EHFDXVHWKH\FDQQRWVSHDNLQDEVROXWHVHFUHF\´
32. Jones, supra note 26, at 424.  
33. FED. R. EVID. 501.  
34. Id.
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Despite the fact that the privilege is codified, the attorney±client privilege 
UHVWVLQWHQVLRQEHWZHHQWKHGLVFORVXUHRI³IXOODQGIUDQNFRPPXQLFDWLRQ>V@´35
between an attorney and her client, and the truth finding process, which is 
essential to the success of the American judicial system.  As stated by Dean 
:LJPRUH³WKHSXEOLF . . . KDVDULJKWWRHYHU\PDQ¶VHYLGHQFH´DQGZKHQWKHUH
is an exemption to this rLJKWWKDWH[HPSWLRQPXVWEH³GLVWLQFWO\H[FHSWLRQDO´36
Although an advocate of the attorney±client privilege, Dean Wigmore 
FKDPSLRQHGDUHVWULFWHGYLHZRIWKHSULYLOHJHVWDWLQJWKDWWKHSULYLOHJH³VKRXOG
be recognized only within the narrowest limits rHTXLUHGE\SULQFLSOH´37  Even 
today, the attorney±client privilege stands at odds with the discovery rules of 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.38  Furthermore, unlike the work product 
doctrine,39 the attorney±client privilege is absolute in nature.40  This means that 
unless the client has waived the privilege or a legislative exception exists, the 
communication will not be exposed regardless of how relevant the information 
is.41  By allowing communications between an attorney and a client to be 
35. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
36. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2192, at 70.  
37. Id. at 73.  
38. Jones, supra note 26, at 425; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (outlining explicit instances when the 
parties have a duty to disclose information).  
39. Many cases that involve the attorney±client privilege also involve the work product doctrine 
in part because third-party consultants may be asked to create a memorandum with recommendations 
for the attorney or client. See, e.g., United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495 (2d Cir. 1995).  A full 
exploration of the effects of the attorney±client privilege, the Kovel doctrine, and the work product 
doctrine is outside the bounds of this Comment.  While this Comment does not fully explore the work 
product doctrine, the work product doctrine is still relevant to the discussion of the attorney±client 
privilege because the attorney±FOLHQWSULYLOHJHDQG WKHZRUNSURGXFWGRFWULQHDUH³LQVHSDUDEOH WZLQ
LVVXHV´1;,90&RUSY2¶+DUD)5'1'1<In addition, the work product 
doctrine claim does not render moot the attorney±client privilege in the context of third-party 
consultants because (1) courts can pierce the work product doctrine, (2) the doctrine only covers advice 
given in response to litigation, and (3) the circumstances in which the work product doctrine is invoked 
are different than the circumstances that typically apply the attorney±client privilege. See Beardslee, 
supra note 5, at 755±59.  For a discussion on the work product doctrine in connection with the attorney±
client privilege, see Gruetzmacher, supra note 17, at 989±94; Jones, supra note 26, at 433±46. 
40. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 270±71.   
41. Id.  The fact that a privilege is absolute does not mean that it does not yield. Id. at 275.  
Rather, the claim can be defeated by a showing that the client waived the privilege, such as by 
disclosing the information to third-party consultants. See id.  However, unlike the work product 
GRFWULQHZKLFKFDQ\LHOGLIWKHSDUW\VKRZVWKDWWKHUHLV³substantial need for the materials to prepare 
>WKH@FDVHDQGFDQQRWZLWKRXWXQGXHKDUGVKLSREWDLQWKHLUVXEVWDQWLDOHTXLYDOHQWE\RWKHUPHDQV´
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii), 
the opposing party cannot override the [attorney±client privilege claim] after the 
fact merely by showing a desperate need for the privileged information; it is 
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612 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:605 
privileged, relevant evidence may be suppressed,42 ZKLFK ³IUXVWUDWH>V@ WKH
investigative or fact-ILQGLQJ SURFHVV´43 DQG KDUPV WKH ³DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ RI
MXVWLFH´44
Despite the tension between the openness of the discovery and litigation 
process, and the secrecy of the attorney±client privileged communications, the 
attorney±client privilege is important because it encourages open 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQDQG³SURPRWH>V@EURDGHUSXEOLFLQWHUHVWVLQWKHREVHUYDQFHRI
ODZ DQG DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ RI MXVWLFH´45 ³>7@KH VRFLDO JRRG GHULYHG IURP WKH
proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their clients,´46 such 
DVSURYLGLQJDFFXUDWHOHJDODGYLFH³RXWZHLJK>V@WKHKDUPWKDWPD\FRPHIURP
WKHVXSSUHVVLRQRIWKHHYLGHQFH´47
In addition to having social utility, there are other arguments as to why the 
attorney±client privilege is beneficial and should not be constructed too 
narrowly.48  Clients are more willing to discuss important information if they 
immaterial that the party now needs the information in order to sustain his or her 
initial burden of production and avoid a directed verdict, nonsuit, or judgment as 
a matter of law. 
Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 275±76; see also State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 
581, 150 N.W.2d 387, 399±400 (1967) (³8QOHVV RQH RI WKH IHZ H[FHSWions can be utilized, the 
protection afforded by the [attorney±client] privilege is absolute.  No showing of necessity, hardship, 
or injustice can require an attorney to reveal the protected information if his client does not waive the 
privilege, no matter how necessary the information is to a resolution of the particular issue on its 
PHULWV´
42. Sexton, supra note 25, at 446. 
43. &RPP¶U of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 901 N.E.2d 1185, 1195 (Mass. 2009) (quoting 
Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., 870 N.E.2d 1105, 1111 (Mass. 2007)). 
44. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2192, at 73 (³7KHLQYHVWLJDWLRQRIWUXWKDQGWKHHQIRUFHPHQWRI
testimonial duty demand the restriction, not the expansion, of these privileges. . . .  Every step beyond 
these limits helps to provide, without any real necessity, an obstacle to the adminiVWUDWLRQRIMXVWLFH´
45. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
46. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1195 (quoting Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., 870 
N.E.2d 1105, 1111 (Mass. 2007). 
47. Id.  
48. For example, some argue an instrumental rationale for the attorney±client privilege, which 
³YLHZV WKHSULYLOHJH DV DQ LQFHQWLYH IRU IXOO GLVFORVXUHE\ WKH FOLHQW´ CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5472, at 80 (1st ed. 1986).  
There are five steps for understanding the application of the attorney±client privilege under this 
instrumental argument: 
1. ³>7@KHODZLVFRPSOH[´Id. at 80. Given that lawyers find it difficult to be 
aware of all legal rules, a layperson would find it almost impossible to 
discover or understand the law for a particular action, let alone understand 
the procedural rules for trial. Id. at 80±81. 
2. ³>,@WLVLQWKHSublic interest that citizens should understand the law and this 
can best be accomplished by allowing them to obtain advice from persons 
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know that the attorney will not disclose or repeat the confidential 
communications.49  If the privilege did not exist, it would irreparably harm the 
administration of advice because clients would be less likely to divulge relevant 
and necessary information.50  Sound legal advice can only occur if all available 
facts are disclosed to the attorney.51  In addition, the privilege may also 
encourage individuals and corporations to comply with regulatory laws since 
they are more likely to communicate with attorneys if they know that their 
communications will be privileged.52  Therefore, while the attorney±client 
SULYLOHJH LV DQ ³H[FHSWLRQ WR WKH JHQHUDO GXW\ WR GLVFORVH . . . [and] its 
REVWUXFWLRQLVSODLQDQGFRQFUHWH´WKHVRFLHWDOEHQHILWVRIWKHSULYLOHJHZDUUDQW
its continued application and success.53  However, many argue that the scope 
of tKH SULYLOHJHG VKRXOG EH ³strictly confined within the narrowest possible 
OHDUQHGLQWKHODZ´Id. at 81. 
3. ³,Q RUGHU IRU WKH ODZ\HU WR JLYH VRXQG DGYLFH RU WR SURSHUO\ SUHVHQW KLV
FOLHQW¶VFODLP it is said that the lawyer must be informed by the client of all 
of the facts, good and bad, WKDWDUHUHOHYDQWWRWKHPDWWHU´Id. at 82.  This is 
a controversial empirical proposition because it has never been tested and 
likely never will be tested. Id.
4. ³>:@LWKRXW WKH SULYLOHJH FOLHQWVZRXOG RQO\ UHODWH WR WKHLU ODZ\HUV WKRVH
facts that were thought to be favorable to their case or useful in obtaining 
WKHGHVLUHGDGYLFHWKDWWKHLUSURSRVHGFRQGXFWLVOHJDO´Id. at 83.  Again, 
this point is controversial and subject to many critiques. See id. at 83±84. 
5. ³>7@KH EHQHILWV WR VRFLHW\ IURP LQFUHDVHG FDQGRU LQ DWWRUQH\±client 
communications outweigh the costs of suppressing evidence of those 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQV´Id. at 84.  This is the most critiqued proposition. See id.
49. Carl Pacini et al., Accountants, Attorney–Client Privilege, and the Kovel Rule: Waiver 
Through Inadvertent Disclosure via Electronic Communication, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 893, 897 (2003); 
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 539 (5th Cir. 1982) (³7he purpose of the privilege is to 
foster full client disclosure to the lawyer; the privilege exists to assure the client that his private 
disclosures will not become common knowledge.´). 
50. See WIGMORE, supra note 23, DW³,QRUGHUWRSURPRWHIUHHGRPof consultation 
of legal advisers by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be 
UHPRYHG KHQFH WKH ODZPXVW SURKLELW VXFK GLVFORVXUH H[FHSW RQ WKH FOLHQW¶V FRQVHQW´ 3DFLQL HW
al., supra note 49, at 897 (arguing that limiting the attorney±client privilege would ³have a negative 
impact on the American justice system.  Clients, knowing that their communications would be subject 
to disclosure, would ultimately be less forthright with their lawyers or sacrifice legal services 
completely.´ Jones, supra QRWH  DW  ³7KH DWWRUQH\±client privilege helps calm the fear of 
potential clients that their communications with the attorney may be disclosed to a third 
party, keeping the potential client from seeking legal advice from an attorney.´
51. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 486³7KHSULYLOHJHUHFRJQL]HVWKDW
sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the 
ODZ\HU¶VEHLQJIXOO\LQIRUPHGE\WKHFOLHQW´
52. Jones, supra note 26, at 424. 
53. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2291, at 554. 
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limits consistent with the logic of its principle.´54  As we will see later on, the 
tension between disclosure and confidentiality, as well as the public policy 
considerations, are extremely important for courts when considering whether to 
expand the attorney±client privilege to third-party consultants.55
Because the attorney±client privilege is based on common law, courts have 
formulated several tests to determine the applicability of the privilege.56  Each 
test contains the same elements articulated in a different manner.57  One of the 
most common formulations of the attorney±client privilege is the following:  
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a 
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the 
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in 
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently 
54. Id.; see &RPP¶URI5HYHQXHY&RPFDVW&RUS1(G±95 (Mass. 2009) 
(stating that the attorney±FOLHQWSULYLOHJHVKRXOGEHFRQVWUXFWHGQDUURZO\WR³SURWHFWWKHFRPSHWLQJ
VRFLHWDOLQWHUHVWRIWKHIXOOGLVFORVXUHRIUHOHYDQWHYLGHQFH´In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 
VW&LUILQGLQJWKDW³the privilege applies only to the extent necessary to achieve its 
underlying goal of ensuring effective representation through open communication between lawyer 
DQGFOLHQW´
55. See infra Part IV. 
56. Jones, supra note 26, at 422±23; Pacini et al., supra note 49, at 899 (³Various tests have been 
set forth by the courts to determine whether the attorney±client privilege applies to a particular case.´
57. For example, one formulation that courts use is the following:  
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the 
person to whom the communication was made (a) is [the] member of a bar of a 
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting 
as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was 
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose 
of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) 
assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a 
crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the 
client. 
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1975); Cottillion v. United Ref. 
Co., 279 F.R.D. 290, 298 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting In re $VRXVD3¶VKLS No. 01±12295DWS, 2005 
WL 3299823, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2005)).  Regardless of which test is used, the 
party claiming the privilege [must] prove the existence of each of the following 
elements: 1. The holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; 2. The 
person to whom a communication is made is a licensed attorney or his agent; 3. 
The attorney is acting as the FOLHQW¶VODZ\HUZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQ
and 4. The communication relates to a matter of which the attorney was informed 
by his client, without the presence of third parties, for the purpose of securing 
legal services and not for the purpose of committing a crime or tort. 
Pacini et al., supra note 49, at 899.  According to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW INST. 1998), the attorney±client privilege may be invoked when WKHUHLV³(1) 
a communication, (2) made between privileged persons, (3) in confidence, (4) for the purpose of 
REWDLQLQJRUSURYLGLQJOHJDODVVLVWDQFHIRUWKHFOLHQW´
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protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, 
(8) except the protection be waived.58
Regardless of which formulation a court articulates, the party claiming the 
privilege has the burden to establish each element of the privilege.59  In addition, 
attorney±client privilege only applies to the communications rendered, not the 
underlying facts of the case.60  Furthermore, the privilege only applies to legal 
advice given, not to business advice.61  For in-house attorneys who typically 
confront business considerations when rendering legal advice to corporate 
clients, this may prove to be a vital and important distinction,62 especially if the 
individual is an attorney and occupies a business role in the organization.63
Indeed, courts have applied a higher scrutiny to in-house counsel in comparison 
58. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2292, at 554; Lisa Borelli Flynn, CEO, CFO, COO . . . Cube 
Dweller? Attorney–Client Privilege and Corporate Communication: Whose Communications Should 
Massachusetts Law Protect?, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 701, 706 (2010) (quoting Brian M. Smith, 
Be Careful How You Use It or You May Lose It: A Modern Look at Corporate Attorney–Client 
Privilege and the Ease of Waiver in Various Circuits, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 389, 392±93 (1998)); 
Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 245 (1st Cir. 2002); Comcast, 901 N.E.2d 1185, 1194 (Mass. 
2009). 
59. United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1461 (7th Cir. 1997). 
60. Pacini et al., supra note 49, at 898; Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 644 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (³>7@KH SULYLOHJH RQO\ SURWHFWV GLVFORVXUH RI FRPPXQLFDWLRQV LW GRHV QRW SURWHFW
disclosure of the underlying facts by thRVHZKRFRPPXQLFDWHGZLWKWKHDWWRUQH\´
61. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359±'0DVV³Where 
a communication neither invited nor expressed any legal opinion whatsoever, but involved the mere 
VROLFLWLQJRUJLYLQJRIEXVLQHVVDGYLFHLWLVQRWSULYLOHJHG´,QGHHGWKHUHLVDUHEXWWDEOHSUHVXPSWLRQ
that an attorney employed in a business position is providing business advice while an attorney 
employed in a legal department of a business is providing legal advice. Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 
No. 02±C±50509, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11485, at *10 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2003).  However, courts will 
protect communications that contain business advice if the primary purpose of the advice was legal in 
nature. See 6XSHU7LUH(QJ¶J&R Y%DQGDJ ,QF ) 6XSS   ('3D ³>7@he 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶VSULPDU\SXUSRVHPXVWEHWRJDLQRUSURYLGHOHJDODVVLVWDQFH7KHSULYLOHJHLVQRW
necessarily lost, however, when some non-legal information is included in a communication seeking 
RUJLYLQJOHJDODGYLFH´
62. 1;,90&RUS Y2¶+DUD  )5'   1'1<  ³,Q WRGD\¶VZRUOG DQ
DWWRUQH\¶V DFumen is sought at every turn, even average attorneys mix legal advice with business, 
HFRQRPLF DQG SROLWLFDO´ see also Hardy, 114 F.R.D. at 643± ³:hen the ultimate corporate 
decision is based on both a business policy and a legal evaluation, the business aspects of the decision 
DUHQRWSURWHFWHGVLPSO\EHFDXVHOHJDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVDUHDOVRLQYROYHG´
63. See Zullig v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., No. 87±2342, 1989 WL 7901, at *2±3 (D. 
Kan. Jan. 17, 1989) (emphasis omitted) (finding that a committee meeting and business report did not 
become shielded by the attorney±client privilege because the communications were not shared with in-
KRXVHFRXQVHO³IRUWKHSXUSRVHRIVHHNLQJOHJDODGYLFH´
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to outside counsel when determining if the advice given was for legal or 
business purposes.64
Overall, the communications must be made in confidence for the purposes 
of rendering legal advice.65  Because the client is the holder of the privilege, 
only the client can waive the privilege.66  If the communications are not 
confidential, then the attorney±client privilege does not apply to the 
communications, and the privilege is waived.67  Such waivers can occur by 
disclosing the communications to a third party or making the communications 
in the presence of a third party.68
However, clients do not waive the attorney±client privilege if the privilege 
LVPDGHRUGLVFORVHGLQWKHSUHVHQFHRIDWKLUGSDUW\ZKRLVWKHDWWRUQH\¶VDJHQW
64. In re 6HDOHG&DVH)G '&&LU KROGLQJ WKDWZKLOH WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V
position as an in-KRXVHDWWRUQH\GRHVQRW³GLOXWHWKHSULYLOHJH´WKHSULYLOHJHZLOORQO\EHDSSOLHGLIthe 
company proves with a clear showing that the in-KRXVHFRXQVHOJDYHDGYLFHZLWKLQ³DSURIHVVLRQDO
OHJDO FDSDFLW\´Chandola v. Seattle Hous. Auth., No. 13-cv-00557RSM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
 DW  :':DVK2FW   FLWDWLRQ RPLWWHG ³>W]hile attorney±client privilege is 
always strictly construed, extra scrutiny is required where in-house counsel is involved, as in-house 
counsel often act in both a legal and non-legal business capacity, and communications made in this 
latter capacity are QRWSULYLOHJHG´ Therefore, although the mix of business and legal advice may not 
prevent the privilege from applying, in-house attorneys have a higher burden to meet when compared 
to outside attorneys. See Jones, supra note 26, at 462±64 (arguing that the higher level of scrutiny for 
in-house counsel is appropriate given the public policies that the courts have articulated and are 
attempting to achieve).   
65. 8QLWHG6WDWHVY6FKZLPPHU)GG&LU³The relationship of attorney 
and client, a communication by the client relating to the subject matter upon which professional advice 
is sought, and the confidentiality of the expression for which the protection is claimed, all must be 
HVWDEOLVKHGLQRUGHUIRUWKHSULYLOHJHWRDWWDFK´).  
66. Jones, supra note 26, at 422. 
67. Gruetzmacher, supra note 17, at 979; Cottillion v. United Ref. Co., 279 F.R.D. 290, 298 
(W.D. Pa. 2011) (³A communication is not made in confidence, and, therefore, is not privileged if 
persons other than the client, the attorney, RUWKHLUDJHQWVDUHSUHVHQW´ MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 91, at 555 (Kenneth S. Brom et al. eds., 7th ed. 2013) (³,WLVRIWKHHVVHQFHRIWKHSULYLOHJHWKDWLWLV
limited to those communications that the client either expressly made confidential or which he could 
reasonably assume under the circumstances would be understood by the attorney as so intended.´); 
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 539 (5th Cir. 1982) (³7KH QHHG WR FORDN WKHVH
communications with secrecy, however, ends when the secrets pDVVWKURXJKWKHFOLHQW¶VOLSVWRRWKHUV
7KXVDEUHDFKRIFRQILGHQWLDOLW\IRUIHLWVWKHFOLHQW¶VULJKWWRFODLPWKHSULYLOHJH´).
68. See Schwimmer, 892 F.2d at 243 (³7he attorney±client privilege generally forbids an attorney 
from disclosing confidential communications that pass in the course of professional employment from 
client to lawyer.´); Beardslee, supra note 5, at 744 ³[T]he privilege does not apply or is considered 
waived when the client voluntarily discloses an otherwise confidential, privileged communication to a 
WKLUGSDUW\´; Pacini et al., supra note 49, at 898±99 (³If a client communicates a matter to his lawyer 
in the presence of a third party who is not an agent of the lawyer, the communication is 
not confidential.´).
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and the communication is necessary to facilitate legal advice.69  Under this 
exception, the communication is still considered confidential and protected by 
the attorney±client privilege despite the fact that a third party has been exposed 
to the communication.70  Due to the complexity of the legal practice, courts 
have extended the attorney±client privilege to multiple types of legal agents, 
such as clerks71 or interpreters.72  As previously noted, the Second Circuit has 
applied the attorney±client privilege to confidential communications shared 
between the client, attorney, and an accountant because the accountant was 
necessary or helpful to the attorney in rendering the legal advice.73  As this 
Comment will explore later on, the application of the attorney±client privilege 
to third-party professional consultants is not a predictable or clear standard to 
follow.74  There is not a single consensus among the federal or state courts as 
to the proper scope of the privilege to communications between third-party 
consultants.75  This lack of consensus among the federal courts makes it harder 
for states who have not yet confronted the Kovel doctrine, such as Wisconsin, 
to determine its applicability and scope.  
B. Attorney–Client Privilege and Corporations 
It was not always intuitive that the attorney±client privilege would be 
available to corporations since the privilege was originally asserted by 
69. )HUNRY1DW¶O$VV¶QIRU6WRFN&DU$XWR5DFLQJ)5'('7H[³An
exception to [the attorney±client privilege waiver] rule exists for third parties who assist an attorney in 
rendering legal advice.´). 
70. Mileski v. Locker, 178 N.Y.S.2d 911, 915± 6XS &W  ³$V a general rule, a 
communication by a client to his attorney by any form of agency employed or set in motion by the 
client is within the privilege.  Accordingly, communications to any person whose intervention is 
necessary to secure and facilitate the communication between attorney and client are privileged, as 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVWKURXJKDQLQWHUSUHWHUDPHVVHQJHURUDQ\RWKHULQWHUPHGLDU\´
71. See Smith v. Mitchell (In re 3XWQDP¶V:LOO1(±01 (N.Y. 1931). 
72. See Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip. Corp., 757 A.2d 14, 23 (Conn. 2000) (stating that 
as a general rule ³WKH attorney±client privilege µH[WHQGV WR interpreters, and to clerks and agents 
employeGE\WKHDWWRUQH\¶´(quoting Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172, 175 (Conn. 1859)).  Courts 
have also extended the attorney±client privilege to other third parties or agents who provided necessary 
information for the rendering of legal advice, such as parents or adult children. See Hendrick v. Avis 
Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 187, 188±90 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Stroh v. Gen. Motors Corp., 623 
N.Y.S.2d 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).  Although there are multiple types of third parties and agents, 
this Comment will primarily focus on the third-party professional consultants that attorneys tend to 
contact for their expertise and knowledge, such as accountants, public relations consultants, investment 
bankers, or actuarial consultants.   
73. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961).  
74. See infra Section IV.A and accompanying notes. 
75. See infra Section IV.A and accompanying notes. 
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individuals.76  However, as early as 1915, the Supreme Court tacitly allowed a 
corporation to utilize the attorney±client privilege without explicitly addressing 
whether corporations in general could in fact claim such a privilege.77  It was 
not until 1963 in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass’n that a Federal 
Court of Appeals first directly answered the question as to whether a 
corporation can assert the attorney±client privilege in the same manner as an 
individual.78 $IWHUUHYLHZLQJWKHORZHUFRXUW¶VUDWLRQDOHIRUQRWDSSO\LQJWKH
privilege to a corporation,79 WKH 6HYHQWK &LUFXLW GHWHUPLQHG WKDW ³EDVHG RQ
history, principle, precedent and public policy the attorney±client privilege in 
LWV EURDG VHQVH LV DYDLODEOH WR FRUSRUDWLRQV´80  Thus, rather than tacitly 
accepting the proposition, the courts after Radiant Burners expressed the 
proposition that corporations had the right to claim attorney±client privilege.81
Because the attorney±client privilege was typically asserted by individuals, 
the lower courts still grappled with the exact application of the attorney±client 
privilege to corporations even after it was accepted that corporations could 
bring a privilege claim.82  Because corporations are fictional entities, they can 
only act through their employees or agents, which can range in the hundreds for 
large corporations.83 %HIRUH WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQLQUpjohn Co. v. 
76. See 5DGLDQW%XUQHUV,QFY$P*DV$VV¶Q)G±18 (7th Cir. 1963). 
77. In United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915), the Supreme Court 
allowed a railroad company to withhold confidential memorandums and communications between the 
corporation and its attorneys.  Rather than examine whether the corporation could even assert any 
privilege, the Supreme Court tacitly found that the privilege could be asserted and stated that   
[t]he desirability of protecting confidential communications between attorney and 
client as a matter of public policy is too well known and has been too often 
recognized by textbooks and courts to need extended comment now. If such 
communications were required to be made the subject of examination and 
publication, such enactment would be a practical prohibition upon professional 
advice and assistance. 
Id. at 336.
78. 320 F.2d at 323. 
79. See id. at 317.  
80. Id. at 323; see also City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 484 
('3DILQGLQJWKDW³Whe availability of the privilege to corporations has gone unchallenged so 
long and has been so generally accepted that I must recognize that it doeVH[LVW´
81. Sexton, supra note 25, at 448. 
82. Id. at 449. 
83. Id. (³[A] corporate entity can speak only through its agents or employees, and there are often 
KXQGUHGVRUHYHQWKRXVDQGVRIDJHQWVRUHPSOR\HHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHFRUSRUDWLRQ´see also Petrina 
v. Allied Glove Corp., 46 A.3d 795, 799 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (³$FRUSoration is a creature of legal 
ILFWLRQZKLFKFDQDFWRUµVSHDN¶RQO\WKURXJKLWVRIILFHUVGLUHFWRUVRURWKHUDJHQWV´
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United States,84 the courts were widely split over which employees were 
considered agents of the corporations for the application of the attorney±client 
privilege.85
In Upjohn, the Supreme Court did not adopt or delineate a specific test for 
determining which employee communications were covered by the attorney±
client privilege.86  Instead, it articulated a broad, expansive, case-by-case 
analysis87 that encouraged protection of the confidential communication shared 
between any level employee and counsel if the communications were made for 
84. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
85. Courts typically adopted one of two approaches to determine whether the attorney±client 
privilege applied to corporate communications: the control group test and the subject matter test. See
Flynn, supra note 58, at 708.  Under the control group test, the attorney±client privilege applied to 
those employees who had control of the decision-making process. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 
)6XSSDW³[I]f the employee making the communication . . . is in a position to control or even 
to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take . . . then, in 
effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the 
SULYLOHJH ZRXOG DSSO\´  Under the subject matter test, the attorney±client privilege applied to 
employee communications made to counsel if the communications were made at the directions of 
VXSHULRUVDQGUHODWHGWRWKHHPSOR\HH¶VFRUSRUDWHGXWLHVSee Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 
423 F.2d 487, 491±92 (7th Cir. 1970) (finding that the SULYLOHJHDSSOLHV³ZKHUHWKHHPSOR\HHPDNHV
the communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter 
XSRQZKLFKWKHDWWRUQH\¶VDGYLFHLVVRXJKWE\WKHFRUSRUDWLRQDQGGHDOWwith in the communication is 
WKHSHUIRUPDQFHE\WKHHPSOR\HHRIWKHGXWLHVRIKLVHPSOR\PHQW´  For a more thorough discussion 
of the control and subject matter tests, see Sexton, supra note 25, at 449±56.  
86. The Supreme Court was aware that the lower courts were grappling with two tests. See 
Upjohn  86 DW   ³:LWK UHVSHFW WR WKH SULYLOHJH TXHVWLRQ WKH SDUWLHV DQG
various amici have described our task as one of choosing between two µWHVWV¶ ZKLFK KDYH JDLQHG
DGKHUHQWVLQWKHFRXUWVRIDSSHDOV´+RZHYHUWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWUHIXVHGWRVSHFLILFDOO\DGRSWDWHVW
Id. 7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWFOHDUO\UHMHFWHGWKHFRQWUROJURXSWHVWEHFDXVHLWZDVQRW³FRQVLVWHQWZLWKµWKH
principles of the common law as . . . interpreted . . . LQ WKH OLJKW RI UHDVRQ DQG H[SHULHQFH¶´ DQG
³frustrate[d] the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant 
information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client 
corporation.´ Id. at 392, 397 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501).  However, the Supreme Court never 
mentioned the subject matter test by name in its opinion. See generally id.; Sexton, supra note 25, at 
458±59.  Despite not articulating the subject matter test, some commentators think that the Upjohn
opinion favors the subject matter test.  For example, Imwinkelried notes the following: 
[O]ne of the essential functions of the privilege is to enable the client to convey 
to the attorney the LQIRUPDWLRQLQWKHFOLHQW¶VSRVVHVVLRQWKDWWKHDWWRUQH\QHHGV
to advise the client.  In stressing that factor, though, the Court clearly gravitated 
toward one of the central policy considerations underlying the subject-matter test. 
Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 296.
87. Upjohn86DWVWDWLQJWKDW³we decide only the case before us, and do not undertake 
WRGUDIWDVHWRIUXOHV´
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the purpose of receiving legal advice.88  In articulating such a standard, the 
Court stated that the purpose of the attorney±FOLHQWSULYLOHJHLV³WRHQFRXUDJH
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby 
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice.´89 7KH&RXUWDFNQRZOHGJHGWKDW³[t]he privilege recognizes that sound 
legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy 
GHSHQGVXSRQWKH ODZ\HU¶VEHLQJIXOO\ LQIRUPHGE\ WKHFOLHQW´90  Therefore, 
while the Supreme Court did not delineate a specific test to determinate what 
communications with employees were covered by the attorney±client privilege, 
the Supreme Court embraced a broader application of the privilege and 
demonstrated a public commitment to protecting confidential communications 
WKDW FUHDWH ³IXOO DQG IUDQN´ FRQYHUVDWLRQV  This underlying rationale and 
purpose behind the attorney±client privilege further helps guide the discussion, 
as we will see, in determining if and how Wisconsin should adopt the Kovel
doctrine.91
III. ATTORNEY±CLIENT PRIVILEGE & THIRD-PARTY CONSULTANTS 
A. The Kovel Doctrine  
While Upjohn articulated a broad application of the attorney±client 
privilege to corporate employees, corporations are increasingly utilizing third-
party consultants to streamline business models, reduce costs, or gain expertise 
on a subject matter.92  Because business and legal advice are often intertwined,93
the rise of third-party consultants means that courts are increasingly confronted 
with the question of whether confidential communication with a third-party 
consultant waives the attorney±client privilege.  
88. See Beardslee, supra note 5, at 742±³7he Court adopted a case-by-case approach that in 
practice has resulted in an expansive rule emphasizing the importance of the flow of information 
between corporate employees and attorneys for sound legal advicH´ Flynn, supra note 58, at 712 
³Although the Court did not adopt an explicit µWHVW¶ WR GHFLGHZKHWKHU WKH FRPPXQLFDWLRQVZHUH
protected in Upjohn, the Court did apply a broader, more subject matter-like test to the facts at hand.´). 
89. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. 
90. Id. 
91. See infra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
92. See supra Part I and accompanying notes; see also Nancy Mann Jackson, How to Build a 
Better Business with Outsourcing, ENTREPRENEUR, https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/204652 
[https://perma.cc/BG26-L6H8] (last visited Aug. 31, 2018).  
93. See supra Part I and accompanying notes. 
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In the landmark case of United States v. Kovel,94 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit was the first court to grapple with this issue.  
Kovel has since become the seminal case on the application of attorney±client 
privilege to third-party communications.95  Kovel was a former career IRS 
agent in accounting who was employed at a tax law firm.96  When the IRS 
LQYHVWLJDWHGRQHRIWKHODZILUP¶VFOLHQWV.RYHOZDVVXESRHQDHGWRDSSHDUDQG
testify in front of the grand jury.97  Although Kovel appeared in court, he 
UHIXVHGWRWHVWLI\RQDQ\FRPPXQLFDWLRQVKHKDGZLWKWKHODZILUP¶VFOLHQWRU
on any work he performed for the client on the grounds that such 
communications and documents were protected by the attorney±client 
privilege.98  The district court found Kovel in contempt, and Kovel was 
sentenced to a year in jail.99
Unlike the circuit court, the court of appeals found that the attorney±client 
privilege did extend to the communications shared between the client and the 
accountant because the accountant assisted the attorney in rendering legal 
advice.100 ,Q UHDFKLQJ WKLV GHFLVLRQ WKH FRXUW ILUVW DFNQRZOHGJHG WKDW ³WKH
complexities of modern existence prevent attorneys from effectively handling 
FOLHQWV¶ DIIDLUV ZLWKRXW WKH KHOS RI RWKHUV´101  The court analogized the 
accountant to that of an interpreter stating that it  
can see no significant difference between a case where the 
attorney sends a client speaking a foreign language to an 
LQWHUSUHWHUWRPDNHDOLWHUDOWUDQVODWLRQRIWKHFOLHQW¶VVWRU\D
second where the attorney, himself having some little 
knowledge of the foreign tongue, has a more knowledgeable 
non-lawyer employee in the room to help out; a third where 
someone to perform that same function has been brought along 
by the client; and a fourth where the attorney, ignorant of the 
foreign language, sends the client to a non-lawyer proficient in 
LWZLWK LQVWUXFWLRQV WR LQWHUYLHZ WKH FOLHQW RQ WKH DWWRUQH\¶V
behalf and then render his own summary of the situation, 
perhaps drawing on his own knowledge in the process, so that 
94. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).  
95. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 280, 284±85. 
96. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 919. 
97. Id.
98. Id. at 919±20. 
99. Id. at 920.  
100. Id. at 922±23.  
101. Id. at 921.  ,QSDUWLFXODUWKHFRXUWQRWHGWKDW³IHZODZ\HUVFRXOGQRZSUDFWLFHZLWKRXWWKH
assistance of secretaries, file clerks, telephone operators, messengers, clerks not yet admitted to the 
EDUDQGDLGHVRIRWKHUVRUWV´Id.
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622 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:605 
the attorney can give the client proper legal advice.102
In particular, the court noted that accounting concepts can function as a 
foreign language to lawyers.103 ,I D IRUHLJQ ODQJXDJH LQWHUSUHWHU¶V SUHVHQFH
does not destroy the privilege, then the court rationalized that the presence of 
an accountant, who is translating complex tax information for the lawyer, 
should not destroy the privilege either.104  For the privilege to be applicable, the 
FRXUWQRWHGWKDW³Whe presence of the accountant [must be] necessary, or at least 
highly useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer 
ZKLFKWKHSULYLOHJHLVGHVLJQHGWRSHUPLW´105
In holding that a third-party consultant may be covered by the attorney±
client privilege, the Second Circuit also articulated a few other principles.  First, 
the court stated that it did not matter if the attorney or the client hired the 
accountant.106  Second, the court also placed an emphasis on the type of 
communications shared rather than the way in which the communications 
RFFXUUHG6SHFLILFDOO\WKHFRXUWVWDWHGWKDW³>Z@KDWLVYLWDOWRWKHSULYLOHJHLV
that the communication be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining 
OHJDODGYLFHIURPWKHODZ\HU´107  As long as the information sought is for legal 
advice rather than business advice or accounting advice, then the privilege 
exists.108  It does not matter if the lawyer directs the client to communicate with 
the accountant and then the accountant interprets the information for the lawyer 
to give accurate legal advice to the client.109  As long as the communications 
are confidential and enable the attorney to give legal advice, then the privilege 
applies.
However, the couUWQRWHGLWKDGGUDZQDQ³DUELWUDU\OLQH´LQWHUPVRIZKDW
communications are covered by the privilege.110  If the client first 
communicates with an accountant and then later communicates with the 
attorney on the same matter, the privilege would not apply.111  On the other 
hand, if a lawyer directs a client to communicate with an accountant or if the 
102. Id.
103. Id. at 922.
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id.
107. Id. (emphasis omitted).  
108. Id. ³,IZKDWLVVRXJKWLVQRWOHJDODGYLFHEXWRQO\DFFRXQWLQJVHUYLFH . . . or if the advice 
VRXJKWLVWKHDFFRXQWDQW¶VUDWKHUWKDQWKHODZ\HU¶VQRSULYLOHJHH[LVWV´FLWDWLRQRPLWWHG
109. Id.; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 273 for an explanation on the three different 
types of communication that occur between the attorney, client, and third-party consultant.
110. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922. 
111. Id.
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client communicates with a lawyer while an accountant is present, then the 
privilege would apply²if the communications were rendered for legal 
advice.112
In sum, the Second Circuit extended the attorney±client privilege to third-
party consultants who translated confidential communications necessary or 
helpful in the rendering of effective legal advice.  Under Kovel, as long as 
confidential communications are made after an attorney has been retained on 
the matter, the communications are likely to be privileged if they are for legal 
advice.  Therefore, the Kovel doctrine has broad implications for corporations 
that are increasingly hiring third-party consultants.   
B. Narrow Interpretation  
Since the Second Circuit decided Kovel, some courts have increasingly 
narrowed their application of the Kovel doctrine to third-party consultants, 
limiting the circumstances under which the attorney±client privilege can be 
applied to third parties.  Narrow interpretations of the Kovel doctrine typically 
consider factors such as (1) whether there is sufficient evidence, other than the 
substance of the communications, to determine that the consultant was hired for 
the facilitation of legal advice;113 (2) whether the third-party consultant 
performs as a translator of client only information;114 or (3) whether the 
communication is necessary, not just useful or important, for the rendering of 
legal advice.115
1. Communications Protected if Sufficient Contemporaneous Evidence  
United States v. Adlman116 is instructive in understanding a narrow 
interpretation of the Kovel doctrine.  Here, the Second Circuit determined that 
the attorney±client privilege did not apply to outside accountants if the 
company failed to meet its evidentiary burden or failed to provide sufficient 
evidence.  In Adlman, the company Sequa was considering a reorganization of 
its subsidiaries.117 $GOPDQDQDWWRUQH\DQG6HTXD¶V9LFH3UHVLGHQWfor Taxes, 
contacted Arthur Andersen & Co. (AA) to help assess the tax implications of 
the reorganization.118  AA and its accountants created a fifty-eight-page 
112. Id.
113. See United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 (2d Cir. 1995).  
114. See id.
115. See United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999). 
116. 68 F.3d 1495 (2d Cir. 1995). 
117. Id. at 1497.  
118. Id. at 1496±97.  
40986 m
qt_102-2 Sheet No. 162 Side B      01/29/2019   13:38:24
40986 mqt_102-2 Sheet No. 162 Side B      01/29/2019   13:38:24
C M
Y K
LOPEZ - MULR VOL. 102, NO. 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2019 10:15 AM 
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memorandum detailing the tax consequences of the reorganization.119  Sequa 
GHFLGHG WR UHRUJDQL]H EDVHG RQ$$¶V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQ DQG VSHFLILFDWLRQV120
Because of this reorganization, Sequa received a large tax refund, which caused 
the IRS to undertake an audit of the company.121  When the IRS requested all 
documentation related to the reorganization, Adlman refused to give the IRS 
$$¶VPHPRUDQGXPRQWKHJURXQGVWKDW it was privileged.122
The Second Circuit found that the attorney±client privilege did not apply 
because Adlman failed to meet his burden in establishing all of the elements of 
the privilege. 123 Adlman thus demonstrates that courts applying a narrower 
interpretation may require strict compliance to meet the Kovel doctrine.124  The 
court found that AA was hired to provide tax advice rather than hired to 
interpret client communications.125  Furthermore, Adlman served as both an 
attorney and as a Vice President for Taxes.126  The fact that Adlman occupied 
WZRUROHVIRUWKHFRUSRUDWLRQDQG³ODFNHGWKHH[SHUWLVHQHFHVVDU\WRDVVHVVthe 
WD[ LPSOLFDWLRQV RI FRUSRUDWH UHRUJDQL]DWLRQV´ PHDQV WKDW $$ GLG QRW KHOS
Adlman render legal advice on the reorganization.127  Rather, the information 
for the fifty-eight-page memorandum on the tax implications originated from 
WKHDFFRXQWDQWV¶RZQH[SHUtise and knowledge.128  Thus, the accountants were 
not acting under the analogy as interpreters to facilitate the rendering of legal 
advice, but instead were performing their traditional third-party consultant 
duties.  Therefore, because Sequa provided the accounting firm with 
information to get advice on the potential tax implications of the reorganization 
rather than for legal advice, the attorney±client privilege did not apply.  
The court in Adlman DOVR EDVHG LWV GHFLVLRQ RQ 6HTXD¶V ODFN RI
contemporaneous documentation supporting the proposition that Adlman hired 
AA to help provide legal advice.129  Sequa regularly employed AA to perform 
auditing, accounting, and advisory services for the company, and AA 
extensively helped Sequa with the reorganization in other respects, such as 
119. Id. at 1497.  
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 1497±98. 
122. Id. at 1498. 
123. See id. at 1500. 
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1496, 1500.   
127. Id. at 1500. 
128. Id.
129. Id.
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through advisory services.130  While AA performed services with both Sequa 
DQG $GOPDQ WKHUH ZDV ³virtually no contemporaneous documentation 
supporting the view that AA, in this task alone, was working under a different 
DUUDQJHPHQWIURPWKDWZKLFKJRYHUQHGWKHUHVWRILWVZRUNIRU6HTXD´131  This 
lack of contemporaneous documentation indicated that the work AA provided 
to Adlman was not any different than the accounting services it typically 
provided to Sequa.132
Therefore, when determining whether Adlman met his burden on all 
elements of the privilege, the court placed significant emphasis on the evidence 
relating to documentation surrounding the services instead of focusing solely 
on the substance of the communications.133  Although the court mentioned that 
WKLVHPSKDVLVGLGQRWHTXDWHWRDQ³elevation RIIRUPRYHUVXEVWDQFH´134 some 
commentators135 and courts136 have indeed found such contemporaneous 
documentation instructive when determining if attorney±client privilege 
applies to third-party consultants.  
Based on this narrow interpretation of the Kovel doctrine, there are certain 
steps that companies or individuals can take before communicating with a third-
party consultant to protect such communications.  First, the attorney, rather than 
the client, should hire the third-party consultant because it will emphasize the 
proposition that the attorney hired the consultant to facilitate the service of legal 
advice.137  For corporations, an outside counsel, rather than in-house counsel, 
130. Id.
131. Id. 7KHELOOLQJVWDWHPHQWVWR$$FRPELQHGERWK$$¶VZRUNIRU$GOPDQDVZHOODV$$¶V
advisory services to Sequa. Id.  In addition, AA, not Adlman, created all the written documentation for 
the tax implications of the reorganization. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1500 n.1.  
135. See Gruetzmacher, supra note 17, at 984  
[D]etermining whether the attorney-client privilege applies to communications 
with accountants involves analyzing form over substance.  Therefore, those who 
³SDSHU´ WKH ILOHZLWK WKH ULJKWDJUHHPHQWVDQGELOOLQJVWDWHPHQWVZLOOVXFFHHG
while those who are a bit sloppy will not, despite the true nature of the relationship 
between the lawyer, accountant, and client. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Beardslee, supra note 5, at 792±93 (arguing that courts should not 
consider form over substance when determining whether the attorney±client privilege applies because 
it is an artificial distinction); Pacini et al., supra QRWH  DW  ³>,@t is incumbent upon those 
claiming attorney±client privilege to produce adequate documentation to demonstrate that the main 
SXUSRVHLQKLULQJWKHDFFRXQWDQWZDVWRDVVLVWWKHDWWRUQH\LQSURYLGLQJOHJDOVHUYLFHV´
136. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 325±26 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003); see also Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 248 (1st Cir. 2002). 
137. Pacini et al., supra note 49, at 924.  
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should hire the third-party consultant, if possible, since courts tend to place a 
higher scrutiny on in-house counsel to prove that the communications were 
rendered for legal and not business advice.138  Second, a written engagement 
letter should be produced between the attorney and the consultant.139  The 
engagement letter should state that the third-party consultant is being hired to 
enable the giving of legal advice; that all communications between the third-
party consultant, the attorney, and the client are intended to be confidential 
according to the attorney±client privilege; the precise scope of the relationship 
between the attorney and the third-party consultant; and that all work product 
produced by the third-party consultant belongs to the law firm and must be 
surrendered when requested.140  Third, if possible, the third-party consultant 
should not be a consultant that the company uses on regular basis, e.g., hiring 
an accountant for legal tax advice who also performs accounting services for 
the corporation.141  Fourth, the attorney should be billed an itemized statement 
by the third-party consultant and pay the expenses, not the client.142  The 
attorney can then send an itemized invoice to the client with the third SDUW\¶V
costs listed in the invoice as expenses.143  Although the court in Adlman stated 
that such actions were not necessary, performing these steps, while not 
determinative, will help a proponent establish the necessary elements of the 
attorney±client privilege under the Kovel doctrine.   
2. Communications Protected only if Translating Client Information  
Some courts strictly applying the Kovel doctrine have also hesitated to 
adopt the attorney±client privilege to communications with third parties if the 
138. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
139. Martin A. Schainbaum, The Scope and Limitations of the Kovel Accountant, CHAMPION,
Mar. 2016, at 26, 28.  
140. Id.; Cheryl C. Magat, How Attorney–Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine May 
Apply to Third Parties in Tax Law, PRAC. TAX LAW., Summer 2011, at 21, 23.  
141. See, e.g., United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 (2d Cir. 1995). 
142. Pacini et al., supra note 49, at 928.  
143. Id.
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information did not originate from the client.144  In United States v. Ackert,145
the Second Circuit did not extend the attorney±client privilege to an investment 
banker in part because the third-party consultant did not translate any client 
communications.146  In this case, Ackert, an investment banker at Goldman 
Sachs, approached a company with an investment proposition which was 
expected to lower its federal income tax liability.147 7KHFRPSDQ\¶VVHQLRUYLFH
president and tax counsel, Meyers, conducted research on the proposal and 
FRPPXQLFDWHGZLWK$FNHUWDERXWWKHLQYHVWPHQWSURSRVDO¶VWD[LPSOLFDWLRQV148
Although the company decided to enter into the proposed investment with 
another investment banker, it still paid Goldman Sachs $1.5 million for its 
services.149
During an audit of the company seven years after the investment, the IRS 
issued a summons for Ackert to testify.150  The company asserted that any 
communications Ackert had with Meyers were covered by the attorney±client 
privilege under the Kovel doctrine.151  Despite Ackert being an investment 
banker rather than an accountant, the company asserted that the 
communications between the two mirrored that of the accountant±attorney 
under Kovel EHFDXVH $FNHUW ZDV RQO\ FRQWDFWHG ³IRU WKH VROH SXUSRVH RI
SURYLGLQJOHJDODGYLFH´DQG³LWZDVLPSRVVLEOHIRU0U0H\HUVWRDGYLVH>WKH
FRPSDQ\@ZLWKRXWWKHVHIXUWKHUFRQWDFWVZLWK0U$FNHUW´152
However, the court refused to extend the Kovel doctrine from an accountant 
to an investment banker because Ackert did not translate information that 
144. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 284 (³[C]ourts have been reluctant to apply the doctrine to 
situations in which the client cannot realistically be characterized as the source of the information 
evaluated by the expert.´); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 161±63 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that privilege did not apply to third-party engineers because the engineers 
FRQVXOWHGWKHDWWRUQH\EDVHGRQ³IDFWXDODQGVFLHQWLILFHYLGHQFHWKH\JHQHUDWHG´Eprova v. Gnosis 
S.p.A., No. 07 civ. 5898, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101215, *3±7 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 24, 2010) (holding that 
the attorney±client privilege did not apply to scientific experts who were providing scientific 
information themselves rather than acting as interpreters); EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY±
CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK±PRODUCT DOCTRINE WKHG³,IWKHLQIRUPDWLRQLV
collected from the client . . . and is digested by the expert for transmission to the attorney so that the 
attorney may render legal advice, there is substantial OLNHOLKRRGWKDWWKHH[SHUWZLOOEHFORDNHG´LQWKH
attorney±client privilege).  
145. 169 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999). 
146. Id. at 139±40. 
147. Id. at 138.  
148. Id. 
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 138±39. 
152. Id. at 139.  
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originated from the client.153  Rather, because the company did not have the 
information regarding the investment proposal and did not know the tax 
consequences, the information communicated between Ackert and Meyers 
RULJLQDWHG IURP $FNHUW¶V RZQ NQRZOHGJH DQG H[SHUWLVH DV DQ LQYHVWPHQW
banker.154  Therefore, because Ackert was not acting as a translator of client 
communication but rather was utilizing his own expertise to furnish the 
communication, the attorney±client privilege did not apply.155
Ackert thus stands for the proposition that the Kovel doctrine will only apply 
if the third-party consultant merely translaWHVWKHFOLHQW¶VRwn communication.  
If the third-party consultant relies on his or her own expertise, a court applying 
the Kovel doctrine narrowly would likely find that the privilege does not apply.  
3. Communications Protected if Necessary, not just Important or Useful  
Some courts have also limited the holding in Kovel by finding that the 
communications between the third-party consultant and the attorney must be 
more than just important or useful to the rendering of legal advice; instead, the 
communications must be necessary.156 Cavallaro v. United States157 was the 
first case to determine that the attorney±client privilege did not apply to an 
accountant because the communication provided was not necessary to the 
furnishing of legal advice.158  In Cavallaro, two parents owned a company 
while their sons owned a glue dispensing manufacturing company.159  In an 
attempt to merge the two companies, the sons communicated with trust and 
estate attorneys and with accountants regarding the merger.160  Based upon this 
communication, the accountants VXJJHVWHG³DVWUDWHJ\IRUPLQLPL]LQJWUDQVIHU
WD[OLDELOLW\´161  Following the advice of the accountants, the two corporations 
153. Id. VWDWLQJ WKDW ³Meyers was not relying on Ackert to translate or interpret information 
JLYHQWR0H\HUVE\KLVFOLHQW´
154. Id. at 139±ILQGLQJWKDW³0H\HUVVRXJKWRXW Ackert for information Paramount did not 
have about the proposed transaction and its tax FRQVHTXHQFHV´
155. See id. at 140. 
156. See, e.g., Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2002); Ackert, 169 F.3d at 136 
G&LU&RPP¶U RI5HYHQXH Y&RPFDVW&RUS1(G ±98 (Mass. 2009); 
Calvin Klein Trademark Tr. v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (refusing to extend the 
attorney±client privilege to PR consultants and their related work documents in part because the 
possibility that the documents may later be important for the facilitation of legal advice was not 
sufficient for the privilege to apply). 
157. 284 F.3d at 236.  
158. Id. at 240, 249.  
159. Id. at 240. 
160. Id. at 239±41. 
161. Id. at 240±41.  
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merged and later sold for $97 million.162  The IRS began an investigation into 
the merger for tax fraud.163  The IRS served the accounting firm for the records 
³FRQFHUQLQJ >WKH@ WUDQVIHU WD[ DQG PHUJHU LVVXHV´164 and requested the 
memorandums dealing with the merger.  The defendants refused to produce the 
documents on the grounds that accounWDQWVDVVLVWHGWKHDWWRUQH\VLQ³SURYLGLQJ
DGYLFHRQWUDQVIHUWD[LVVXHV´165
In finding that the accountants were not within the Kovel doctrine, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit quoted Kovel and stated 
WKDW³to sustain a privilege aQDFFRXQWDQWPXVWEHµQHFHVVDU\RUDWOHDVWKLJKO\
useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer, which 
WKH SULYLOHJH LV GHVLJQHG WR SHUPLW¶´166  Despite the fact that Kovel
characterized the privilege as applying if the communicDWLRQLV³QHFHVVDU\RU
DWOHDVWKLJKO\XVHIXO´167 the First Circuit limited the circumstances in which 
WKHSULYLOHJHDSSOLHVVWDWLQJWKDWWKH³µQHFHVVLW\¶HOHPHQWPHDQVPRUHWKDQMXVW
XVHIXO DQG FRQYHQLHQW´168  Rather, the communication with the third-party 
FRQVXOWDQW³PXVWEHQHDUO\LQGLVSHQVDEOHRUVHUYHVRPHVSHFLDOL]HGSXUSRVHLQ
facilitating the attorney-client communications.  Mere convenience is not 
VXIILFLHQW´169  Such a characterization allows courts to scrutinize and limit the 
circumstances under which communications with third-party consultants could 
be protected.  
In addition to the communication being necessary, the court in Ackert also
articulated that the attorney±client privilege does not apply to a third-party 
consultant even if the communicaWLRQV DUH ³LPSRUWDQW´ WR WKH DWWRUQH\ LQ
rendering legal advice.170  Although Meyers, the attorney, likely communicated 
with Ackert, the investment banker, to gain information and offer better legal 
advice to the company, the court found that such a distinction was not sufficient 
for the application of the privilege.171  In particular, the court stated that the  
privilege protects communications between a client and an 
162. Id. at 243.   
163. Id. at 239. Specifically, the IRS was examining whether the parties had undervalued the 
³FRPSDQ\WRGLVJXLVHDJLIWWRWKHVRQVLQWKHIRUPRISRVW-PHUJHUVWRFN´Id. 
164. Id.
165. Id. at 239, 242. 
166. Id. at 247±48 (quoting United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961)).  
167. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922.  
168. Cavallaro, 284 F.3d at 249 (quoting EDNA S. EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY±CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
AND THE WORK±PRODUCT DOCTRINE 187 (4th ed. 2001)). 
169. Id.
170. United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999). 
171. Id.
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attorney, not communications that prove important to an 
DWWRUQH\¶V OHJDO DGYLFH WR D client. . . .  [A] communication 
between an attorney and a third party does not become shielded 
by the attorney±client privilege solely because the 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ SURYHV LPSRUWDQW WR WKH DWWRUQH\¶V DELOLW\ WR
represent the client.172
Therefore, even though communications between an attorney and a third 
party may be important and relevant for the attorney to render effective legal 
advice, if the communications are not necessary or nearly indispensable, a court 
applying a narrow application of the Kovel doctrine may be unwilling to apply 
the privilege to communications with third-party consultants.173
C.  Broad Interpretation 
Some courts have also adopted a broader interpretation of the Kovel
doctrine.174  Jurisdictions adopting a broad interpretation of the Kovel doctrine 
typically apply the attorney±client privilege to communications that are helpful 
in facilitating legal advice.175  For example, in Aull v. Cavalcade Pension 
Plan,176 the court found that communications between an attorney, client, and 
outside accountant were covered by the attorney±client privilege under the 
172. Id.
173. See &RPP¶URI5HYHQXHY&RPFDVW&RUS1(GMass. 2009) (analyzing the 
narrow interpretation of the Kovel doctrine, including both Cavallaro and Ackert, before determining 
that the attorney±client privilege did not apply).  
174. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 477 (E.D. Pa. 2005) 
VWDWLQJWKDWWKH³Plaintiff did not waive the privilege merely by revealing confidential communications 
WRLWVRZQFRQVXOWDQW´United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975) (applying the 
attorney±client privilege to a psychiatric expert because the court did not see DQ\³GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ
the need of defense counsel for expert assistance in accounting matters and the same need in matters 
RISV\FKLDWU\´ Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 518±19 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
³,f the patent agent is acting to assist an attorney to provide legal services, the communications with 
him by the attorney or the client should come within the ambit of the privilege´; Cuno, Inc. v. Pall 
Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 
98Civ.8520, 1999 WL 1006312, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1999) (finding privilege to memorandum 
shared between the company, the attorney, and actuaries); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 
)6XSSG6'1<VWDWLQJWKDWWKHFRXUWLV³SHUVXDGHGWKDWWKHDELOLW\
of lawyers to perform some of their most fundamental client functions . . . would be undermined 
seriously if lawyers were not able to engage in frank discussions of facts and strategies with the 
ODZ\HUV¶SXEOLFUHODWLRQVFRQVXOWDQWV´
175. Beardslee, supra note 5, at 731; Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 284± ³[S]ome 
jurisdictions broadly invoke the doctrine whenever the expert helps the attorney give the client fully 
LQIRUPHGDGYLFH´
176. 185 F.R.D. 618 (D. Colo. 1998).  
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Kovel doctrine.177  The court rationalized that the accountant was covered by 
GRFWULQHLI³7KHDFFRXQWDQWZDVFRQVXOWHGLQFRQILGHQFHIRUWKHSXUSRVHRI
obtaining legal advice from the lawyer, and; 2) The communications between 
the accountant, client, and the lawyer are reasonably related to the purpose of 
REWDLQLQJ FRQILGHQWLDO OHJDO DGYLFH IURP WKH ODZ\HU´178  This broad 
interpretation of applying the Kovel doctrine whenever the third-party 
consultant advice is helpful for or reasonably related to the rending of legal 
advice stands in stark contrast to the narrow interpretations explained above.  
The less strict interpretation of the Kovel doctrine has been applied to 
physiatrists,179 patent agents,180 actuaries,181 public relations consultants,182 and 
jury consultants.183
While some courts have applied a broader interpretation of the Kovel
doctrine, it has been argued that this application is the minority view of 
courts.184  Commentators have also argued that courts should be cautious when 
adopting a broader view of the attorney±client privilege to external 
consultants.185  Opponents argue that an expansion of the Kovel doctrine 
primarily benefits wealthier clients and should only be done for compelling 
reasons,186 or that an expansive view of the Kovel doctrine denies the public to 
177. Id. at 628±30.  
178. Id. at 629.  
179. See, e.g., Alvarez)GDWVWDWLQJWKDWWKHUHLV³no distinction between the need 
of defense counsel for expert assistance in accounting matters and the same need in matters of 
SV\FKLDWU\´
180. See, e.g., Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 518±19, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992) (articulating that the privilege should apply if the patent agent was assisting the attorney); 
Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Comput. Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1429, 1446 (D. Del. 1989) 
(applying the attorney±FOLHQW SULYLOHJH WR FRPPXQLFDWLRQV ³EHWZHHQ DQ DWWRUQH\ D FOLHQW DQG DQ
independent patent agent, if that patent agent is working on behalf of and under the direction of the 
DWWRUQH\´&XQR,QFY3all Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding patent documents 
SULYLOHJHGEHFDXVHWKHSDWHQWDJHQWZDV³DFWLQJXQGHUWKHDXWKRULW\DQGFRQWURO´RIWKHDWWRUQH\V
181. Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 98Civ.8520, 1999 WL 1006312, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1999) (finding that attorney±client privilege extends to actuaries reviewing a 
PHPRUDQGXPIRUWKHDWWRUQH\EHFDXVHLW³assist[s] the attorney in preparing the final version of the 
letter . . . [and] LVZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRIWKHOHJDOVHUYLFHVWKDWWKHDWWRUQH\LVSURYLGLQJ´
182. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) ³This Court is persuaded that the ability of lawyers to perform some of their most fundamental 
client functions . . . would be undermined seriously if lawyers were not able to engage in frank 
GLVFXVVLRQVRIIDFWVDQGVWUDWHJLHVZLWKWKHODZ\HUV¶SXEOLFUHODWLRQVFRQVXOWDQWV´
183. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 668±69 (3d Cir. 2003) (Garth, J., concurring).   
184. &RPP¶URf Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 901 N.E.2d 1185, 1198 n.20 (Mass. 2009).   
185. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 311±12; Beardslee, supra note 5, at 731, 733.  
186. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 311±12.  
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³HYHU\PDQ¶VHYLGHQFH´187 DQG³HQDEOHVFRUSRUDWHPLVFRQGXFW´188  While these 
public policy statements may align with the purposes underlying the attorney±
client privilege,189 courts have still applied a broader view of the Kovel doctrine 
when the communications between an attorney and a third-party consultants 
help in the facilitation or rendering of legal advice.   
IV. STATES¶ ANALYSES OF THE KOVEL DOCTRINE
A. State Adoption of the Kovel Doctrine  
Whether communications between an attorney, client, and a third-party 
consultant are protected under the attorney±client privilege is not an isolated 
federal issue.  Rather, it is an issue that affects all states as well as the global 
market since businesses nationwide have increasingly relied on third-party 
consultants.190  Although the Kovel doctrine originated in the Federal courts and 
stems from Federal Rules of Evidence 501, state courts have also addressed the 
issue of whether the attorney±client privilege applies to confidential 
communications shared between attorneys and third-party consultants.191
Similar to the federal courts, state courts have yet to adopt a single and uniform 
consensus as to how broadly or narrowly the Kovel GRFWULQH¶V scope should be 
187. WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2192, at 70. 
188. Beardslee, supra note 5, at 731. 
189. See supra Part II. 
190. See supra Part I.  See generally Steve Lohr, Hot Spot for Tech Outsourcing: The United 
States, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/30/technology/hot-spot-for-
tech-outsourcing-the-united-states.html [https://perma.cc/M4RW-ZWXF]. 
191. See, e.g., &RPP¶URI5HYHQXHY&RPFast Corp., 901 N.E.2d 1185 (Mass. 2009); Delta Fin. 
Corp. v. Morrison, 820 N.Y.S.2d 745 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equip. 
Corp., 757 A.2d 14 (Conn. 2000); People v. Marcy, 283 N.W.2d 754 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (citing 
cases that discuss Kovel favorably and protecting communications between a polygrapher, client, and 
the attorney under the attorney±client privilege); People v. Paasche, 525 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1994); Bousamra v. Excela Health, 167 A.3d 728 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017); State v. Carter, 641 
S.W.2d 54, 65 (Mo. 1982); State v. Aquino-Cervantes, 945 P.2d 767, 772 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (citing 
Kovel favorably to determine that an interpreter is an agent of the attorney and cannot testify about 
observations seen during interpretation of a client); RCC, Inc. v. Cecchi, No. 323447, 2010 Md. Cir. 
Ct. LEXIS 8, at *7±9 (Nov. 18, 2010); Foisie v. Foisie, No. FA114115278S, 2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
4333 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2017).  
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applied.192  Rather, state courts typically analyze federal cases to determine 
whether the doctrine should be adopted in their jurisdiction.193
Some state courts are hesitant to adopt the Kovel doctrine broadly.  The 
most prominent example of a state court adopting a narrow interpretation of the 
Kovel doctrine is the Massachusetts Supreme Court.  In Commissioner of 
Revenue v. Comcast Corp.,194 the Massachusetts Supreme Court determined 
that communications between an in-house counsel and outside tax accountants 
were not protected by the attorney±client privilege.195  The Supreme Court held 
this in part because the attorney±client privilege had been narrowly constructed 
LQ0DVVDFKXVHWWV¶s MXULVGLFWLRQDQG³>D@QDUURZFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHSULYLOHJHLV
particularly appropriate where, as here, information is being withheld from the 
government in a tax enforcement SURFHHGLQJ´196
In adopting a narrow interpretation of the Kovel doctrine, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court analyzed and discussed multiple federal cases limiting the 
original holding of the Kovel doctrine.  Comcast favorably cited Cavallaro and 
Ackert¶VQarrow opinions,197 which stated that the privilege is only applicable 
if the communications are necessary rather than solely useful or substantially 
KHOSIXOWRWKHDWWRUQH\¶VDELOLW\WRJLYHOHJDODGYLFH198  Furthermore, the court 
192. Some courts call the Kovel doctrine the derivative privilege.  Although the name may be 
different, the application is still the same: the derivative privilege protects communications between 
attorneys and a third party when the communication is necessary or helpful for the rendering of legal 
advice. See, e.g., Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1196; Delta Fin. Corp., 820 N.Y.S.2d at 750 (stating that 
³the derivative privilege protection recognized by Kovel and subsequent cases did not apply to the 
GRFXPHQWV´
193. For example, a few state courts have analyzed or mentioned the Maryland district court 
opinion of Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 219 F.R.D. 87 (D. Md. 2003), to determine whether 
the Kovel doctrine should apply to their fact situation. See, e.g., Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1198; Delta 
Fin. Corp., 820 N.Y.S.2d at 750±51; RCC, Inc., 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 8.  The federal district court 
in Black & Decker decided that there were four factors to consider for the derivative privilege (Kovel
GRFWULQHWRDSSO\³WRZKRPZDVWKHDGYLFHSURYLGHG²FRXQVHORUWKHFOLHQWZKHUHFOLHQW¶VLQ-
house counsel is involved, whether counsel also acts as a corporate officer; 3) whether the accountant 
LVUHJXODUO\HPSOR\HGDVWKHFOLHQW¶VDXGLWRURUDGYLVRUDQGZKLFKSDUWLHVLQLWLDWHGRUUHFHLYHGWKH
FRPPXQLFDWLRQV´)5'DW%\XVLQJWKHVHIDFWRUVWKHBlack & Decker court determined that 
the communications were not needed to facilitate the communications between the attorney and the 
third-party consultants. Id.  Although the opinion is only a district court and does not seem to be very 
relevant in the federal circuits, state courts have analyzed Black & Decker and used its four factors to 
apply a narrow interpretation of the Kovel doctrine.  
194. 901 N.E.2d 1185 (Mass. 2009).  
195. Id. at 1200. 
196. Id. at 1195.  
197. Id. at 1197±99. 
198. See supra Section III.B.3 and accompanying notes.  
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decided that the communications were not made for legal advice or to help the 
attorney comprehend client information but instead for tax advice.199  Even 
WKRXJK WKH DFFRXQWDQW¶V PHPRUDQGXP PD\ KDYH EHHQ ³FULWLFDO WR >WKH
DWWRUQH\¶V@ DELOLW\ WR HIIHFWLYHO\ UHSUHVHQW KLV FOLHQW´ VXFK UHliance was not 
sufficient for the privilege to apply.200  Therefore, by quoting and citing other 
cases with a narrow application of the Kovel doctrine, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court demonstrated that although the court was perhaps willing to 
extend the attorney±client privilege to third-party consultants in its jurisdiction, 
the scope would have to be narrowly focused.   
However, not all state courts adhere to the narrow interpretation of the 
Kovel doctrine as demonstrated in Comcast.  For example, in Olson v. 
Accessory Controls & Equipment Corp.,201 the Connecticut Supreme Court 
protected a report made by a third-party environmental consulting firm.202  The 
defendant owned a manufacturing plant that produced hazardous waste 
material, and after receiving an order from the State Department of 
Environmental Protection (Department), the defendant retained an attorney.203
The attorney then hired an environmental consulting firm to assist the 
GHIHQGDQW¶V counsel in responding to an order issued by the Department 
concerQLQJWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VZDVWHFRQWDPLQDWLRQVLWH204
In determining whether the attorney±client privilege applied to the 
HQYLURQPHQWDOFRQVXOWLQJILUP¶VUHSRUWWKHVWDWHFRXUWDQDO\]HGDIHZQDUURZ
cases205 where federal courts determined that the privilege did not apply to 
factual data compiled by environmental consultants.206  However, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court refused to adopt a narrow interpretation, finding 
WKDWD³EULJKWOLQHUXOH´was not applicable.207  Rather, the court partly relied on 
an engagement letter between the environmental consulting firm and the 
attorney as well as the conduct between them to determine that the privilege 
applied.208  The court found that the sole purpose of the communication and the 
report was to assist the attorney in providing legal advice regarding the 
199. Comcast, 901 N.E.2d at 1198. 
200. Id. 
201. 757 A.2d 14 (Conn. 2000). 
202. Id. at 17, 21. 
203. Id. at 18±19. 
204. Id.
205. Id. at 24±25. 
206. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); 
In re Grand Jury Matter, 147 F.R.D. 82, 86 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
207. Olson, 757 A.2d at 25. 
208. Id. at 26±28. 
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Department¶V RUGHU209  Therefore, while some state courts have adopted a 
narrow interpretation of the Kovel doctrine, there are other courts that will not 
immediately draw the narrowest application possible, but rather will apply a 
broader scope of the Kovel doctrine, if it is consistent with the facts present.  
B. Wisconsin, the Attorney–Client Privilege, and the Kovel Doctrine 
Although many state courts have considered the issue of whether the 
presence of a third-party consultant waives the attorney±client privilege, 
:LVFRQVLQ¶V FRXUWV KDYH \HW WR DGGUHVV WKH LVVXH  *LYHQ WKH FKDQJH DQG
complexity in the modern business practices210 and the fact that Wisconsin is 
home to multiple Fortune 500 companies,211 business organizDWLRQV¶GHFLVLRQV
to hire third-party consultants are not likely to decrease.  Wisconsin courts 
should thus adopt the Kovel doctrine in a way that is still consistent with these 
UHDOLWLHVDVZHOODVWKHFRXUWV¶SROicies underlying the privilege.   
Codified in 1878, the attorney±client privilege has deep roots in 
:LVFRQVLQ¶VMXULVSUXGHQFH212  The privilege can be traced to early Wisconsin 
common law,213 DQGLWLVDOVRHPERGLHGLQ:LVFRQVLQ¶V6XSUHPH&RXUW5XOHV
209. Id. at 26±27. 
210. See supra Part I and accompanying notes. 
211. According to Fortune Magazine, Wisconsin has QLQHFRPSDQLHVRQWKH)RUWXQH0DJD]LQH¶V
500 list. Molly Dill, Wisconsin Has 9 Companies on 2018 Fortune 500 List, BIZTIMES (May 21, 2018, 
12:10 PM), https://www.biztimes.com/2018/industries/energy-environment/wisconsin-has-9-
companies-on-2018-fortune-500-list/ [https://perma.cc/V4HD-L2ER].  In addition, Foxconn, the 
ZRUOG¶VODUJHVWPDQXIDFWXUHURIHOHFWURQLFVLVDOVREXLOGLQJDPDQXIDFWXULQJSODQWLQ:LVFRQVLQZKLFK
could potentially hire 13,000 workers. Kelvin Chan, What is Foxconn?  Only the World’s No. 1
Contract Electronics Maker, CHI. TRIB. (July 27, 2017, 7:37 AM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-what-is-foxconn-20170727-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/YLY7-U2X8]; Patrick Marley and Jason Stein, Foxconn Announces $10 Billion 
Investment in Wisconsin and up to 13,000 Jobs, J. SENTINEL, (July 26, 2017, 10:38 AM), 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/2017/07/26/scott-walker-heads-d-c-trump-prepares-wisconsin-
foxconn-announcement/512077001/ [https://perma.cc/2DTZ-S75C].  
212. See Harney B. Stover & Mary Pat Koesterer, Attorney–Client Privilege in Wisconsin, 59 
MARQ. L. REV7KHVWDWXWHVWDWHGWKDW³>D@QDWWRUQH\RUFRXQVHORUDWODZVKDOOQRWEH
allowed to disclose a communication made by his client to him, or his advice given thereon in the 
FRXUVHRIKLVSURIHVVLRQDOHPSOR\PHQW´Id. (quoting REV. WIS. STAT. § 4076 (1878)).   
213. See, e.g., .RHEHUY6RPHUV:LV1:³It is essential 
to the ends of justice that clients should be safe in confiding to their counsel the most secret facts, and 
to receive advice and advocacy in the light thereof without peril of publicity.  Disclosures made to this 
end should be as secret and inviolable as if the facts had remained in the knowledge of the client 
DORQH´
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of Professional Conduct,214 :LVFRQVLQ¶V$WWRUQH\¶V2DWK215 DQG:LVFRQVLQ¶V
current statutory scheme.216
Wisconsin courts have laid out the policy underlying the attorney±client 
SULYLOHJH DQG KDYH HYHQ VWDWHG WKDW ³WKH UXOH >IRU WKH SULYLOHJH@ LV FOHDU´217
Similar to WKH IHGHUDO FRXUWV¶ MXVWLILFDWLRQV WKH :LVFRQVLQ 6XSUHPH &RXUW
upholds the attorney±client privilege as a rule that encourages clients to 
FRPPXQLFDWHIUHHO\ZLWKRXW³IHDURIGHWULPHQWRUHPEDUUDVVPHQW´218  Although 
the privilege may conceal relevant information, courts justify the rule by stating 
that the attorney±client privilege will typically lead to better representation and 
a better resolution of the issue.219  For example, in State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit 
Court for Milwaukee Cty.,220 the Wisconsin Supreme Court articulated that  
[i]t is better to have otherwise concealed facts within the 
knowledge of the person charged with the direction of the 
lawsuit, even though he must not reveal the communication, 
than to have those facts or opinions buried within the 
knowledge of the client . . . .  Although the communication 
may not be revealed unless the client so wishes, the result of 
the privilege is a more informed resolution of controversy, at 
least in the aggregate number of cases.221
Consequently, applying the privilege, in the aggregate, leads to a better 
resolution of the matter.  In addition to that underlying policy, Wisconsin courts 
have also typically held that the scope of the privilege should be strictly 
confined and narrowly aSSOLHG EHFDXVH LW UHSUHVHQWV DQ ³REVWDFOH WR WKH
214. WIS. SCR D³A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized 
in order WRFDUU\RXWWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´
215. WIS. SCR ³I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my 
FOLHQW´
216. WIS. STAT. § 905.03 (2015±2016).
217. State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 578, 150 N.W.2d 387, 398 (1967). 
218. Id.; see also Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., 2002 WI 28, ¶ 21, 251 Wis. 2d 68, 640 N.W.2d 
³7KHSROLF\XQGHUO\LQJWKLVSULYLOHJHLVWRHQVXUHIXOOGLVFORVXUHE\FOLHQWVZKRIHHOVDIH
FRQILGLQJLQWKHLUDWWRUQH\´
219. See Dudek, 34 Wis. 2d at 578; Jacobi v. Podevels, 23 Wis. 2d 152, 157, 127 N.W.2d 73, 76 
(1964) VWDWLQJWKDW³>V@HFUHF\RIFRPPXQLFDWLRQEHWZHHQRQHSHUVRQDQGKLVDWWRUQH\LVRQHRIWKH
H[FHSWLRQV´WR WKHWUXWKILQGLQJSURFHVVRIWKHMXVWLFHV\VWHPDQGWKDWWKHH[FHSWLRQ³LVEDVHGXSRQ
recognition of the value of legal advice and assistance based upon full information of the facts and the 
corollary that full disclosure to counsel will often be unlikely if there is fear that others will be able to 
FRPSHODEUHDFKRIWKHFRQILGHQFH´
220. 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967).  
221. Id. at 578. 
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LQYHVWLJDWLRQ RI WKH WUXWK´222 DQG LV DQ DEVROXWH SULYLOHJH ZLWK D ³GUDVWLF
FRQVHTXHQFH >WKDW@ VKRXOG EH QDUURZO\ FRQILQHG´223  Therefore, the policy 
justifications underlying the attorney±client privilege doctrine in Wisconsin are 
very similar to the typical justifications other courts and experts rely on.   
7RGD\:LVFRQVLQ¶VDWWRUQH\±client privilege is codified in the Wisconsin 
Rules of Evidence in § 905.03.  Section 905.03(2) states in part that ³[a] client 
has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from 
disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client: between the client or the 
FOLHQW¶V UHSUHVHQWDWLYH DQG WKH FOLHQW¶V ODZ\HU RU WKH ODZ\HU¶V
representative . . . ´224 &RPPXQLFDWLRQ LV GHHPHG ³FRQILGHQWLDO´ XQGHU WKH
VWDWXWH ³if [the communication was] not intended to be disclosed to third 
persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition 
of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the 
WUDQVPLVVLRQRIWKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´225  Finally, in order to be a representative 
RIWKHODZ\HU³one [must be] employed to assist the lawyer in the rendition of 
SURIHVVLRQDO OHJDO VHUYLFHV´226  Therefore, the combination of the policy 
justifications as well as the codified attorney±client privilege statute help define 
an understanding of the application of the privilege in Wisconsin.   
C. Wisconsin’s Adoption of the Kovel Doctrine  
Based on its statutory provision and the policy justifications underlying the 
attorney±client privilege doctrine,227 Wisconsin courts should adopt the Kovel
doctrine.  However, the scope of the Kovel doctrine should be limited to some 
extent.  In making this determination, this Comment will first examine the 
statute itself to assess how the Kovel GRFWULQHILWVZLWKLQ:LVFRQVLQ¶VFRGLILHG
attorney±client privilege and then turn to what scope the courts should apply.  
Specifically, Wisconsin courts should adopt an interpretation of the Kovel
doctrine that is not too stringent as to render the application of the privilege 
impossible. 
222. Jacobi, 23 Wis. 2d at 157 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2291, at 554).  
223. Dudek, 34 Wis. 2d at 581; see also discussion supra Section II.A. 
224. WIS. STAT. § 905.03(2) (2015±2016). 
225. Id. § 905.03(1)(d). 
226. Id. § 905.03(1)(c). 
227. Id. § 905.03; Dudek, 34 Wis. 2d at 578±80.  
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1. The Kovel 'RFWULQH)LWV:LWKLQ:LVFRQVLQ¶V&RGLILHG$WWRUQH\±Client 
Privilege  
The definition of the attorney±client privilege is very relevant in 
determining whether Wisconsin courts should adopt the Kovel doctrine and, if 
VRXQGHUZKDWFRQGLWLRQV %HFDXVH:LVFRQVLQ¶VDWWRUQH\±client privilege is 
codified, a court would first need to ensure that the Kovel doctrine is consistent 
with the statute.  Arguably, the Kovel doctrine fits well within Section 905.03(2) 
if a Wisconsin court determines that the third-SDUW\FRQVXOWDQWLVWKHODZ\HU¶V
representative.  Indeed, if a court determines that an attorney hired a third-party 
FRQVXOWDQW WR ³assist the lawyer in the rendition of professional legal 
VHUYLFHV´228 it would very much so emulate the rationale in Kovel for extending 
the attorney±client privilege to the accountant.  While one could argue that a 
third-SDUW\FRQVXOWDQWLVQRWDODZ\HU¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYHEXWUDWKHUDQLQGLYLGXDO
hired for her expertise and knowledge, as demonstrated earlier, courts have 
indeed found that the third-party consultants can provide information that 
assists attorneys in providing legal services.229  A third-party consultant could 
thus become a representative of the attorney and prevent the privilege from 
being waived.  
The definition of confidential also supports the assertion that the privilege 
would not be waived.230 %\ EHLQJ DQ DWWRUQH\¶s representative, third-party 
FRQVXOWDQWVDQG WKHLUFRPPXQLFDWLRQVDUH³in furtherance of the rendition of 
SURIHVVLRQDOOHJDOVHUYLFHVWRWKHFOLHQW´RU DUH³UHDVRQDEO\QHFHVVDU\´IRUVXFK
legal advice.231  As stated previously, the growth of third parties consulting with 
businesses will make attorneys more prone to communicating with consultants 
for the furtherance of legal advice.232  Consequently, any communication made 
in the presence of third parties would still be confidential.  Therefore, 
statutorily, a Wisconsin court could determine that the Kovel doctrine is 
consistent with its codified attorney±client privilege.   
2. Proper Scope of the Kovel Doctrine in Wisconsin 
Although a court could, under the right circumstances, determine that the 
Kovel GRFWULQH LV DSSOLFDEOH ZLWK:LVFRQVLQ¶V DWWRUQH\±client privilege, the 
228. WIS. STAT. § 905.03(1)(c). 
229. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (holding that attorneys would not be able to perform their basic duties to their clients if they 
could not discuss legal strategy with public relations consultants).  
230. WIS. STAT. § 905.03(1)(d). 
231. Id. § 905.03(1)(d).  
232. See supra Part I and accompanying notes. 
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court would still need to determine the proper scope of the privilege.  Because 
there is no consensus in both state and federal courts on the proper scope of the 
Kovel GRFWULQHWKHSROLFLHVVXUURXQGLQJ:LVFRQVLQ¶VDWWRUQH\±client privilege 
DQGWKHFRXUW¶VSUHYLRXVXVHVRIWKHSULYLOHJHDUHLQVWUXFWLYHRQWKHPDWWHU7KH
purpose of the attorney±client privilege is to encourage clients to communicate 
with attorneys for the rendering of accurate legal advice.233  Given the rise of 
corporations outsourcing more and utilizing third-party consultants for legal 
advice, not adopting the Kovel doctrine or adopting it extremely narrowly, such 
as by utilizing all three narrow factors,234 would likely limit the ability of 
attorneys to give confidential legal advice.  For example, adopting all three 
factors would likely create a rigid and narrow interpretation of the attorney±
client privilege that would apply in very limited, if any, situations.  This would 
render the purpose of the Kovel doctrine²and the privilege itself²useless.  
Applying a strict construction of the Kovel doctrine defeats the rationale of the 
attorney±client privilege and fails to adequately balance the need for privileged 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ DJDLQVW WKH MXVWLFH V\VWHP¶V VHDUFK IRU WUXWK  However, 
applying the broad interpretation standard of merely helping or facilitating legal 
advice would likely have negative effects on the litigation and truth finding 
process, as it may overextend the application of the privilege.235
7KHUHIRUH EDVHG RQ:LVFRQVLQ¶V XQGHUO\LQJ SROLF\ MXVWLILFDWLRQV IRU WKH
attorney±client privilege and the illustrative federal and state Kovel cases, 
Wisconsin courts should adopt the Kovel doctrine in a manner more lenient than 
the most stringent interpretation, but stricter than the broad interpretation of the 
doctrine.  Specifically, Wisconsin should adopt a narrow approach that does not 
take into account all three factors, but rather only considers the two factors of 
providing sufficient contemporaneous evidence and translating client only 
information.236  Examining these two factors will enable a court to effectively 
determine whether the third-party consultant is truly assisting an attorney in 
providing legal advice as well as provide some predictability.  
For the first factor, analyzing whether there is sufficient evidence enables 
the courts to determine if the purpose of the privilege was met.  Providing 
sufficient evidence to the court, such as an engagement letter or demonstrating 
specific hiring and billing patterns, illustrates that the purpose of hiring the 
third-party consultant was to provide legal advice.  Although it could be argued 
233. See supra Section II.A and accompanying notes. 
234. See supra Section III.B and accompanying notes. 
235. See supra Section III.C and accompanying notes. 
236. See supra Section III.B and accompanying notes for an explanation of the narrow 
interpretations of the Kovel doctrine. 
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that advocating for an approach that considers contemporaneous documentation 
may undercut the specific substance and relationship of the attorney, client, and 
third party, Wisconsin courts should consider the contemporaneous evidence in 
addition to the substantive information rather than as a substitute.237  By 
utilizing this factor, the courts could provide some predictability for attorneys 
using third-party consultants.  Specifically, attorneys can strengthen the 
likelihood that communications with a third-party consultant are privileged by 
creating an engagement letter or performing some of the actions described 
earlier.238  Although it likely is not completely necessary that a party have 
contemporaneous evidence to prove that the Kovel doctrine should apply, such 
documentation can be both helpful and instructive in determining its 
applicability.  
In addition to applying the first factor, Wisconsin courts should also adopt 
an approach that considers whether the third-party consultant translated client 
RQO\ LQIRUPDWLRQ  7KLV IDFWRU LV LQ NHHSLQJ ZLWK :LVFRQVLQ¶V RZQ SROLF\
determination of encouraging clients to communicate freely to attorneys.  By 
examining whether third-party consultants use their own information, rather 
than the cOLHQW¶V LQIRUPDWLRQ WR SURYLGH DGYLFH WR WKH DWWRUQH\:LVFRQVLQ
courts can ensure that the privilege is not too broadly applied or prevents the 
truth-finding process.  In addition, companies and attorneys can consider before 
hiring a consultant what information that third-party consultant would be using, 
which can potentially offer more predictability in this area.  
Therefore, Wisconsin courts should utilize a narrow but lenient approach in 
adopting the Kovel doctrine by only considering two factors when deciding if 
the attorney±client privilege applies to communications between an attorney, 
client, and third-party consultants  7KLV LV LQ NHHSLQJ ZLWK :LVFRQVLQ¶V
common law and policy justifications of applying the privilege narrowly, as 
well as with the reality that businesses are going to increasingly rely on third-
party consultants in the facilitation of legal advice due to the complexities of 
modern business practices.  With that being said, as the court stated in Dudek,
³>X@QWLO WKH GHPDQG IRU LQIRUPDtion is made and the precise nature of the 
information sought is disclosed it is impossible for the court, upon whom the 
ODZ KDV FDVW WKH GXW\ RI GHFLGLQJ WKH TXHVWLRQ WR GHWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU´ WKH
237. For example, in United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 (2d Cir. 1995), the court 
found that the privilege did not exist because the attorney failed to provide sufficient substantive 
evidence as well as contemporaneous evidence to support the privilege.  This case demonstrates a way 
that courts have decided whether the privilege applies with the help or lack of contemporaneous 
documents or attorney actions.  
238. See supra Section III.B.1 and accompanying notes. 
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attorney±client privilege will apply.239  Therefore, although Wisconsin courts 
should adopt a narrow, but lenient approach, to the Kovel doctrine, such 
application will greatly depend on the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
FRXUW¶V ILUVWEUXVKZLWKZKHQFRQILGHQWLDOFRPPXQLcations are shared with a 
third-party consultant for the purposes of rendering legal advice.   
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the attorney±FOLHQW SULYLOHJH LV ROG DQG ³>Q@DUURZO\ GHILQHG
ULGGOHGZLWKH[FHSWLRQVDQGVXEMHFWWRFRQWLQXLQJFULWLFLVP´240 it is a vital part 
of the legal profession.  Without the privilege, communications between clients 
and attorneys would cease to operate in the same manner and would irrevocably 
KDUPDODZ\HU¶VDELOLW\WRJLYHDFFXUDWHDQGHIIHFWLYHOHJDODGYLFH241  Given the 
rise in businesses reorganizing and outsourcing to consultants, the legal 
business model is also shifting.242  To give proper legal advice, attorneys will 
increasingly need to engage in confidential communications with third-party 
consultants.  While the Kovel doctrine allows communication between 
attorneys, clients, and third-party consultants to be protected if the 
communication is necessary or helpful in the rendering of legal advice, there is 
no consensus among both the federal and state courts as to the proper scope of 
the doctrine.  This unpredictability and lack of clarity provides uncertainty as 
to whether vital communications with third-party consultants are covered under 
the attorney±client privilege.  With the rise of third-party consultants, courts 
need to address this issue when it is presented in order to provide as much 
clarity as possible.  
%DVHG RQ :LVFRQVLQ¶V VWDWXWRU\ VFKHPH FRPPRQ ODZ DQG SROLFLHV
underlying the attorney±client privilege, Wisconsin courts should adopt the 
Kovel doctrine, if presented with the opportunity.  Such a decision would be 
wise given the increasing use of communicating with consultants among 
businesses and the Kovel GRFWULQH¶V HDV\ ILW ZLWKLQ :LVFRQVLQ¶V FRGLILHG
attorney±client privilege.  In terms of scope, Wisconsin should adopt a 
moderately narrow approach that takes into consideration the contemporaneous 
evidence presented as well as whether only client information was translated.  
This will ensure that the approach is not too stringent that the privilege rarely 
applies but for in a few circumstances but also one that is not too broad that it 
disrupts the ability of society to gather evidence and generate the truth.  While 
such an adoption will likely need to wait until the facts are before the court, 
239. State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 582, 150 N.W.2d 387, 400 (1967).  
240. United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989). 
241. See supra Part II and accompanying notes. 
242. See supra Part I and accompanying notes. 
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given the increase in the use of such third-party professional consultants, the 
day that the Wisconsin Courts confront and address this issue is likely in the 
not too distant future.    
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